Electorate's Partisan Evaluations: Evidence of a Continuing Democratic Edge by Geer, John Gray
THE ELECTORATE'S PARTISAN 
EVALUATIONS: EVIDENCE OF A 
CONTINUING DEMOCRATIC EDGE 
JOHN G. GEER 
Abstract Scholars have devoted a good deal of attention to 
studying changes in how the public evaluates the Democratic and 
Republican parties. However, there have been few attempts to 
examine the underlying components of the changes in these over- 
all evaluations of the parties in detail. By recoding the Center for 
Political Studies' open-ended likes/dislikes questions for parties, 
this paper maps change in the underlying partisan evaluations of 
the electorate since 1952. The results suggest that the Democrats 
have remained the favored party, despite some gains by the GOP 
in recent years. Of the eight issues studied, the Republicans have 
made significant inroads only on the economic front. The findings 
also highlight the obstacles that face the Republican's effort to 
gain majority status, suggesting why it has remained the minority 
party for over 50 years, and why it is likely to remain in that 
position in the near future. 
With the defeat of Michael Dukakis in 1988, the Democrats have lost 
five of the last six presidential elections, winning ten or fewer states 
in four of those contests. The Democrats have also lost a sizable share 
of self-identified partisans in recent years. In 1980, for instance, the 
Democrats held a twenty percentage point lead over the Republicans. 
By 1988, that lead had shrunk to about six percentage points. In addi- 
tion, there are indications of a pro-Republican tide among the youth 
of the nation, suggesting that further gains by the GOP may be on the 
horizon. Work by Cavanagh and Sundquist (1985), Norpoth (1987), 
Norpoth and Kagay (1989), Petrocik (1987), Shanks and Miller (1989), 
and Wattenberg (1987 and 1990) all lend support to the claim that the 
fortunes of the Democratic party have been waning. 
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While the GOP has made gains in the 1980s, this trend need not 
continue. The fortunes of the parties have had peaks and valleys over 
the last 50 years. In 1964, for instance, the GOP appeared to be re- 
treating on nearly all fronts. Yet by 1968, the GOP had won the White 
House and had also made sizable inroads into the Democrat's edge in 
self-identified partisans. Such shifts suggest that we should be cautious 
when interpreting the recent changes in the public's attitudes toward 
the parties. Caution may be particularly appropriate in this case, given 
that the Democrats retain a plurality of self-identified partisans, control 
both houses of Congress, and hold a majority of governorships and 
legislatures in the fifty states. 
To detect the depth of the GOP's gains and thereby develop a better 
sense of the relative standing of the two parties, I examine changes in 
the public's evaluations of Democratic and Republican parties since 
1952. This examination does not include the public's assessment of 
presidential contenders. By setting aside attitudes toward the two nom- 
inees, one avoids contaminating the estimates of partisan support in 
the electorate. It is possible, for instance, that the gains by the GOP 
in recent years are tied, in part, to Reagan's personal popularity rather 
than any enduring change in how the public evaluates the two parties. 
Thus, by limiting attention to just the public's evaluation of the parties, 
one can better estimate the underlying support for the parties in the 
electorate. 
To generate these estimates of "underlying support," I first examine 
shifts in the citizenry's overall evaluation of the parties, and second, 
and more important, I examine the changes in the public's evaluation 
of particular issues that make up these broader assessments. Thus, for 
instance, do citizens view the Democrats or GOP more favorably on 
such matters as the economy, foreign policy, or race relations? And 
has the Democratic (or Republican) lead on these issues expanded or 
contracted over the last ten years? 
The Evidence 
To measure change in the public's partisan evaluations, I rely on the 
National Election Studies' (NES) open-ended questions on the likes/ 
dislikes of the two parties. The actual wording of these questions is: 
-Is there anything in particular you like about the (Democratic or 
Republican) party? If yes, what is that? Anything else? 
-Is there anything in particular you don't like about the (Demo- 
cratic or Republican) party? If yes, what is that? Anything else? 
Scholars have long recognized the merits of these questions. Stokes, 
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Campbell, and Miller (1958), for instance, saw two major advantages 
in using these data. First, since respondents can answer questions in 
their own words, these questions tap the "diversity or relative fre- 
quency of ideas" (1958, 369). As a result, one can get a handle on 
concerns that are salient to the electorate (Kelley 1983; RePass 1971). 
This aspect of the data may be crucial, since scholars generally agree 
that an issue must be salient to citizens before it can alter their evalua- 
tions of the parties (Campbell et al. 1960; Carmines and Stimson 1981 
and 1984; Sundquist 1983). Moreover, since the NES codes up to five 
comments per respondent for the four questions, one gets a good sense 
of the diversity of public opinion.' Of course, not all citizens make 
comments, but respondents, on average, make between three and four 
observations about the parties. 
The second advantage of these data, noted by Stokes, Campbell, 
and Miller (1958), is that one can examine comparable data from each 
presidential election since 1952. The data currently span four decades, 
providing an excellent opportunity to study change in the electorate's 
partisan evaluations.2 
Issues 
The comments from the NES open-ended questions can be used to 
detect the influence of specific "issues" or concerns on the public's 
evaluation of the parties. The NES codes about 400 different re- 
sponses. By grouping these comments to represent different political 
issues, one can estimate their influence on the public's evaluation of 
parties. The critical question becomes: How does one group these 
various comments? Stokes, Campbell, and Miller (1958) classified the 
comments according to the respondents' attitudes toward the candi- 
dates, group-related concerns, the parties as managers of government, 
domestic issues, and matters of foreign policy. Kelley (1983) expanded 
on work by Stokes and his collaborators, providing a more detailed 
breakdown of domestic and foreign policy issues. On the domestic 
front, for instance, he examined such concerns as the "election's eco- 
nomic impact," ideological stance, or medical care. 
1. In 1972, the CPS released only three comments per question for each respondent, 
rather than the normal five. In another version of the data, all five comments were 
included. I want to thank Michael Kagay for making this latter version available to me. 
2. Note that some scholars have serious doubts about the data generated by the like/ 
dislike questions (see Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Smith 1989). Other scholars see 
merit in these data (Geer 1988 and 1991; Kelley 1983; Knight 1985; RePass 1971; Watten- 
berg 1990). I prefer to avoid this debate here, and make only the claim that these data 
shed light on how the electorate judges the parties. 
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Building on these earlier works, I developed a coding scheme to 
examine the following sets of concerns: the economy; foreign policy; 
race relations; social-welfare matters; political philosophy; concerns 
about big business and labor; the management of government; and 
"contemporary" issues, which include references to crime, drugs, 
busing, abortion, gun control, and women's rights (see the appendix 
for details about the coding).3 These issues, obviously, are only a sub- 
set of all possible concerns. But they cover many of the major disputes 
facing parties and should shed light on how the public evaluates the 
parties. 
Estimating the Influence of Issues 
To determine the impact of an issue on how the electorate evaluates 
the parties, we must first determine its salience and then estimate 
whether the public views one party more favorably than the other on 
that issue. Fortunately, Kelley (1983) provides a way to estimate the 
salience and the partisan bias of issues using the NES's open-ended 
questions. According to Kelley, salience is simply the proportion of 
respondents "who cite a given issue as something to like or dislike 
about the major parties . . ." (1983, 61).4 Bias, on the other hand, is 
the proportion of citizens who favor one of the parties on a particular 
issue. To estimate bias, one first subtracts the pro-Republican com- 
ments from the pro-Democratic comments for that particular issue.5 
The result is a scale that can range from + 10, a highly Democratic 
score, to - 10, a highly Republican score. With this measure, one 
then divides the number of respondents who favor one party by all 
respondents who favor either party on that issue, yielding what Kelley 
calls bias (see Kelley 1983, 60-64). 
With measures of salience and bias, one can then calculate the parti- 
san influence of an issue. Here, I want to introduce a new concept, 
3. See Kessel 1984 for a different, but useful, coding scheme. 
4. One could quarrel with this measure of salience, since for an issue to be salient all 
an individual has to do is mention it once. Surely, other issues are likely to be important 
to citizens besides those mentioned in an open-ended format. The problem is that as- 
sessing the salience of an issue to the public is difficult. Closed-ended questions do not 
offer much of an alternative, since they also run into problems (Zaller and Feldman 
1990). But, at least, the open-ended format does encourage respondents "to define [their] 
own issue space by naming issues that were salient to [them]" (RePass 1971, 391). 
5. There are two items to keep in mind when one adds and subtracts these comments. 
First, a "pro-Democratic" comment is either a statement about why a respondent likes 
the Democratic party or likes the Republican party. The reverse holds for "pro- 
Republican" comments. Second, in the calculation of these scales, I weigh each com- 
ment equally. For thoughtful defenses of the equal weighting assumption, see Kagay 
1980 and Kelley 1983. 
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Net Pull, the relative ability of the two parties to attract supporters on 
a given issue. To determine the pull of an issue for a party, one multi- 
plies the bias for a party by its salience. The result is the "proportion 
of . . . respondents who see a given issue as favoring a given . . . 
party" (Kelley 1983, 61). One then calculates the pull of any issue for 
both parties, subtracting the two proportions to yield the Net Pull. The 
specific formula is: 
Net Pull = (salience of an issue x Democratic bias on that issue) 
- (salience of an issue x Republican bias on that issue) 
Estimates of pull for both parties are necessary, since highly salient 
issues may have a lot of pull for each party. For example, an issue 
that is salient to the public with a Democratic bias of 60% will still 
help the Republicans gain a more positive evaluation among the 40% 
who see the issue favoring the GOP. Therefore, looking only at the 
pull for one party provides a misleading picture of the overall influence 
of that issue on the electorate's partisan evaluations. Net Pull avoids 
this problem by providing direct insight into how an issue yielded 
change in the net partisan evaluations of the electorate. A useful way 
to think about this concept is that it estimates the lead one party has 
over the other on a particular issue. 
One final methodological task involves estimating the public's over- 
all evaluation of the two parties. Here I shall follow a simple procedure 
first adopted by Stokes, Campbell, and Miller (1958): namely, summing 
all the respondents' likes and dislikes of the two parties. This summa- 
tion is used to generate three indicators of party support. First, "net 
Republican score" indicates the proportion of respondents who made 
more pro-Republican comments than pro-Democratic comments. "Net 
Democratic score," as one might guess, is just the reverse. "Neu- 
trals," on the other hand, are those citizens who made no comments 
about either party or who made an equal number of pro-Democratic 
and pro-Republican comments. 
The Findings 
Table 1 reports the public's overall partisan assessments from 1952 to 
1988. One obvious pattern in table 1 is that, from 1968 to 1980, the 
proportion of neutrals nearly doubled. This trend, which Wattenberg 
(1990) has carefully documented, suggests that both parties were fur- 
ther away from majority status in the 1980s than they were in the 
1950s. My purpose, however, is to examine the shifts in the elector- 
ate's relative assessment of the parties, which is well summarized by 
the net Democratic edge. Here, the results suggest that the GOP has 
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Table 1. The Electorate's Overall Partisan Evaluations, 1952-88 
Net Democratic Neutral Net Republican Net Democratic 
Score Score Score Edge N 
1952 44.4% 16.3% 39.3% 5.1% 1,799 
1956 44.0 22.2 33.8 10.2 1,762 
1960 44.7 21.6 33.6 11.1 1,932 
1964 48.2 25.7 26.1 22.1 1,571 
1968 37.1 23.8 39.1 - 2.0 1,557 
1972 35.3 35.9 28.9 6.4 1,372 
1976 38.7 37.2 24.1 14.6 2,870 
1980 33.9 41.1 25.0 8.9 1,570 
1984 34.8 38.9 26.3 8.5 2,257 
1988 36.1 34.8 29.1 7.0 2,040 
NOTE: The proportions are the result of simply adding up the likes and dislikes of 
the parties. A net Republican score could range from - 1 to - 10. A net Democratic 
score could fall between 1 and 10. Individuals who either made no comments or 
whose comments cancelled each other out were given neutral scores. The net Demo- 
cratic edge is derived by subtracting the net Republican score from the net Demo- 
cratic score. 
not made significant inroads into Democratic support. If one, for in- 
stance, looks at the net Democratic edge between 1952 and 1960, the 
average lead was about 9 percentage points. From 1980 to 1988, that 
lead was about the same-8 percentage points. This is not the only 
story one could tell, however. If one, instead, compares the net Demo- 
cratic edge in 1964 to that of 1988, the GOP has made important gains. 
But it is unclear why the high point of Democratic support should be 
one's starting point. In contrast, one might compare 1968 to 1988. In 
that case, the Democrats have made sizable strides in the last twenty 
years. Using the low point of Democratic support also poses problems. 
These results, in sum, are open to a number of interpretations. But it 
is hard to escape one simple fact: the electorate continues to evaluate 
the Democrats more positively than the Republicans. 
Table 2 provides a detailed breakdown of these evaluations, examin- 
ing the partisan direction for eight issues across the last four decades. 
Of all the issues examined, concerns about big business-labor are 
clearly the most important to the electorate's assessment of parties. 
From 1952 to 1988, about 35% of the electorate, on average, mentioned 
concerns about labor or big business in their likes and dislikes about 
the parties. These attitudes have remained decidedly in favor of the 
Democrats during that time. The Democratic bias has consistently hov- 
ered at around 88%, generating net pulls of nearly 30%. No other issue 
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Table 2. Changes in the Electorate's Partisan Evaluations, 
1952-88 (in percentages) 
Issue 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 
Government management 
Salience 25 9 11 14 15 10 14 14 12 19 
Dem bias 7 18 34 42 29 45 34 19 33 36 
Net pull -22 -6 -4 -2 -6 -1 -5 -9 -5 -6 
Foreign policy 
Salience 29 24 25 17 25 18 14 12 21 25 
Dem bias 18 18 33 37 15 32 31 25 44 39 
Net pull -18 -15 -8 -4 -18 -7 -4 -6 -3 -6 
Race 
Salience 5 6 8 15 9 3 3 3 2 2 
Dem bias 63 60 72 54 68 70 80 98 82 61 
Net pull 1 1 4 1 3 1 2 3 2 1 
The economy 
Salience 60 32 34 21 30 20 26 19 24 31 
Dem bias 56 62 54 58 41 64 66 37 46 39 
Net pull 7 8 3 4 -5 6 9 -5 -2 -9 
Big business-labor 
Salience 39 41 37 36 32 35 34 34 31 35 
Dem bias 88 88 85 87 87 89 88 88 89 88 
Net pull 30 31 36 26 24 27 26 25 24 27 
Philosophy 
Salience 23 15 19 23 25 18 19 20 24 26 
Dem bias 42 45 40 28 32 33 32 36 36 41 
Net pull -4 -2 -4 - 11 -9 -6 -7 -5 -7 -5 
Social welfare 
Salience 17 18 17 17 16 12 11 12 15 23 
Dem bias 86 81 70 77 64 47 50 42 57 69 
Net pull 12 11 7 9 5 -1 0 -2 2 9 
"Contemporary" issues 
Salience - - 4 3 2 6 8 
Dem bias 44 36 57 44 34 
Net pull - -1 -1 1 -1 -3 
NOTE: Salience is the proportion of respondents who made at least one comment 
about the issue. Dem bias is the proportion of respondents who see an issue favoring 
the Democrats. The Republican bias equals 100% minus the Democratic bias. Neu- 
trals are excluded from this calculation. Net pull is the proportion of respondents 
"pulled" by the issue toward a particular party. A negative sign means the pull is to- 
ward the Republican party. Pull is arrived at by multiplying salience by bias for the 
party. 
studied here has had such a powerful effect on the public's assessment 
of the parties. Interestingly, one foundation of the New Deal was that 
the Democrats were the party of the working man and woman, and 
that image appears to remain a centerpiece of the citizens' partisan 
evaluations-even 50 years after FDR set the New Deal in motion. 
While the Democrats benefit greatly from that issue, other concerns 
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have consistently favored the GOP. For instance, comments about 
foreign policy, political philosophy, and how the government is run 
have all exhibited a pro-Republican edge in each of the last ten presi- 
dential elections. The degree of support for the GOP varies from elec- 
tion to election, but the net pulls show a consistent GOP advantage. 
While the Republicans have positive ratings on these three issues, their 
lead has not increased in recent years. If one compares, for instance, 
the net pulls for these three issues in 1988 to the same measures in 
1980 (or 1976), there is very little change. 
The influence of concerns about social welfare, on the other hand, 
sends mixed signals. From 1972 to 1980, the GOP experienced sizable 
gains in the public's evaluation on this issue. During these three elec- 
tions, the Democratic bias averaged about 46%. This shift was quite a 
reversal of fortunes: between 1952 and 1964 the Democratic bias was 
about 79%. But in the last two elections, the Democrats have reestab- 
lished an edge on these matters. In 1988, for instance, the net pull for 
the Democrats was about the same as it was in 1960 and 1964. Ac- 
cording to these data, there does not appear to be a rejection of the 
Democrats' position on social-welfare concerns by the public in 1984 
or 1988-one of the commonly cited cornerstones of an emerging Re- 
publican majority. 
One potentially important change in favor of the GOP does, how- 
ever, emerge on the economic front. Since 1980, the public has begun 
to view the GOP more favorably on matters pertaining to the economy. 
In 1976, for instance, the Democratic bias was 66%. By 1988, it had 
slipped to 39%, yielding a net pull of 9% for the Republicans. It appears 
that Carter's economic difficulties combined with Reagan's economic 
successes have led the public to think of the Republicans as the "party 
of prosperity." And since economic issues are often salient when citi- 
zens evaluate the parties, this change bodes well for the GOP. 
The two remaining concerns, "contemporary" and racial issues, 
have simply not been salient enough to generate significant change in 
the public's evaluation of the parties. The low salience of "contempo- 
rary" issues has led to net pulls of just - 1% in three of the last five 
elections. Racial issues follow a similar pattern. Between 1972 and 
1988, only about 2% to 3% of the electorate made any references to 
racial concerns. With such low salience, these issues have been unable 
to recast the electorate's partisan evaluations. The only exception was 
1964, when racial matters were salient to 15% of the public. But in 
that year the Democratic bias was just 54%, leading to a small overall 
impact for those concerns.6 
6. One may find this last set of findings surprising, given that race is generally viewed 
as a central issue in U.S. politics over the last 40 years (see Carmines and Stimson 
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The Newest Cohort 
Even though tables 1 and 2 indicate that the Democrats continue to 
garner more favorable evaluations than the Republicans, perhaps the 
youngest members of the electorate have developed more positive 
evaluations of the GOP than of the Democrats. Because of generational 
replacement, these changes among the youth could fuel a future GOP 
majority, as Norpoth (1987) and Norpoth and Kagay (1989) suggest. 
To test this possibility, I examined the partisan evaluations of the 
18-29-year-olds for the last three presidential elections. 
The data in table 3, however, lend little support to the interpretation 
that the GOP has built a favorable impression among the youth of the 
1980s. In each of the last three presidential elections, these citizens 
have favored the Democratic party. The Democratic edge ranged from 
2 percentage points in 1980 to 12 percentage points in 1984. These 
young citizens do, however, tend to be more neutral in their assess- 
ment of parties than the entire public, suggesting that neither party has 
captured their imaginations. But even though these 18-29-year-olds 
have less to say about the parties, the partisan content of their re- 
sponses is similar to that of the entire electorate (see table 4). Com- 
ments about labor and big business, for example, strongly favor the 
Democrats. For social welfare concerns, the Democrats maintained a 
small edge in net pull in 1984 and 1988, again indicating that, among 
these newest voters, there has not been a widespread rejection of the 
Democrats' position on social spending. On economic issues, the GOP 
holds a lead comparable to its lead among the entire electorate. All in 
all, it would be difficult to argue that the newest members of the elec- 
torate will provide a foothold for the GOP as it strives to become the 
majority party. 
Conclusion 
These results show that the Democratic party, despite recent defeats 
in presidential elections, remains the favored party. The Democratic 
edge in the public's overall partisan evaluations is about the same in 
1989). These data may underestimate the influence of racial issues, especially since 
respondents may be hesitant to mention these concerns for fear of saying something 
socially unacceptable. This argument surely has merit, but there may be more to the 
story. In 1964, for instance, the salience of racial concerns rose to 15%, suggesting that 
a good number of citizens were willing to mention this matter in some situations. In 
addition, the proportion of citizens citing racial concerns has dropped since 1964, sug- 
gesting that racial issues are less salient to the public's partisan evaluations in the 1980s 
than they were in the 1960s. 
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Table 3. Changes in Partisan Evaluations of 18-29-Year-Olds, 
1980-88 (in percentages) 
Net Democratic Neutral Net Republican Net Democratic 
Score Score Score Edge N 
1980 25 52 23 2 422 
1984 33 46 21 12 548 
1988 29 46 25 4 450 
NOTE: See table 1 for description of measures. 
the 1980s as it was in the 1950s. In addition, the electorate's relative 
evaluation of the Democrats and Republicans on seven of the eight 
issues studied here have not changed greatly over the last 20 years. 
The Democrats continue to benefit greatly from concerns associated 
with big business and labor and also remain ahead on social-welfare 
matters. The only significant change occurs for economic issues, where 
the GOP have built a lead over the Democrats in recent years. Finally, 
the youth of the nation do not appear to be pro-Republican in their 
evaluations of the parties, suggesting that generational change may not 
lead to a GOP majority. These data, in sum, suggest that continuity, 
rather than change, is an important theme underlying the public's rela- 
tive evaluations of the parties from 1952 to 1988. 
This analysis also has more general lessons for the study of partisan 
change. Specifically, the idea that issues pull and tug on citizens' over- 
all evaluations of parties highlight the many obstacles that face the 
minority party's climb to the top. First, table 2 shows that few issues 
have had great impact on the overall partisan evaluations of the elec- 
torate. Except for concerns about big business and labor, no issue has 
had an average net pull of more than 10% during the 36-year period. 
It makes sense that most issues will be salient to only a portion of the 
population, especially given the diversity of the U.S. electorate. But 
because of this diversity, most issues simply lack the power to reshape 
the partisan moorings of the entire electorate. 
A second obstacle is that many issues confront the public at any one 
time-each tugging and pulling on the citizens' overall evaluations of 
the parties. The economic growth during the Reagan administration, 
for instance, has surely given many young voters reason to support 
the Republicans. But simultaneously, other positions of the GOP, such 
as those on social-welfare issues, may be retarding partisan change 
toward them. Since there is this pull-and-tug effect and few issues have 
widespread salience, it becomes clearer why it has been over 50 years 
Table 4. Changes in Partisan Issue Evaluations 
of 18-29-Year-Olds, 1980-88 (in percentages) 
Issue 1980 1984 1988 
Government management 
Salience 12 10 14 
Dem bias 19 43 40 
Net pull -7 - 1 - 3 
Foreign policy 
Salience 13 24 27 
Dem bias 27 53 36 
Net pull -6 1 -8 
Race 
Salience 2 2 1 
Dem bias 100 89 83 
Net pull 2 2 1 
The economy 
Salience 17 20 28 
Dem bias 14 42 35 
Net pull -12 -3 -8 
Big business-labor 
Salience 20 24 24 
Dem bias 84 87 86 
Net pull 14 18 17 
Social welfare 
Salience 8 11 16 
Dem bias 39 73 78 
Net pull - 2 5 9 
Philosophy 
Salience 17 20 20 
Dem bias 46 54 57 
Net pull -1 2 3 
"Contemporary" issues 
Salience 2 7 7 
Dem bias 40 32 50 
Net pull -1 -3 0 
NOTE: See table 2 for description of measures. 
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since a new majority party emerged. The forces associated with low- 
salience issues can only chip away at the partisan evaluations of the 
electorate. 
This argument strongly suggests that permanent, large-scale shifts 
in the overall partisan evaluations of the public may be impossible 
without both a highly salient issue that dominates the concerns of most 
citizens and an issue that is perceived by the public as heavily favoring 
one party-just as Sundquist (1983) and others have argued. The Great 
Depression and FDR's response to it apparently brought such a shift. 
Without a shock of similar magnitude, partisan evaluations will change 
only slowly and modestly, as Key (1959) observed over 30 years ago. 
Given the logic of this analysis, the pro-Democratic evaluations may 
well continue. And at least at this point, Reagan's legacy, although 
important, does not appear to be strong enough to have significantly 
altered the overall partisan evaluations of the U.S. public, suggesting 
that the Democrats have reason for optimism as they enter the decade 
of the 1990s. 
Appendix 1 
Open-ended comments are recoded into eight different groups of issues. A list 
of the specific codes for each issue and a sample of some of the kinds of 
comments in the categories is given below. For a detailed account of Kelley's 
coding scheme for the 1964 and 1972 elections, see Kelley 1983 (239-62). No 
measure of coding reliability is available, since only a single coder (the author) 
was used. 
I have only presented the coding scheme for 1984. From 1972 to 1988, the 
NES's coding arrangement has been nearly identical. Prior to 1972, however, 
the codes varied a bit from year to year. The actual content of the responses 
did not change, but the numeric code assigned to the responses did shift. Exact 
codes for the years before 1972 can be obtained by writing to the author. 
The Economy: 605, 606, 901, 926 to 941, 1007 to 1009 
-The party would spend less/more 
-The party would lower/raise taxes 
-The party supports a government program to create jobs 
-Inflation would be better/worse under the party 
Social-Welfare Policies: 905-15, 920-25, 942-54, 1001, 1003, 1215-16, 1219-22 
-The party favors welfare/poverty programs 
-The party favors expansion of social security/pensions 
-The party is against aid to education 
-The party is against national health insurance 
Government Management: 601-4, 607-20, 697 
-The party runs a good/efficient administration 
-The party runs honest government 
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-The party supports reforming the bureaucracy 
-The party works well with Congress 
Foreign Policy: 1101-97 
-The party favors a strong military 
-The party handles trouble spots well 
-The party handles Russia well 
-The party favors a nuclear freeze 
Big Business-Labor: 952-58, 1201, 1202, 1205-10, 1233, 1234 
-The party favors privileged people 
-The party supports the common man/working people 
-The party supports unions 
-The party helps the poor 
Race: 946-48, 1217-18 
-The party favors civil rights 
-The party is opposed to integration 
-The party supports voting rights 
-The party favors blacks 
Political Philosophy: 162-65, 805-28, 833-34, 837-38, 902, 904 
-The party is against social change 
-The party favors the work ethic 
-The party is opposed to a planned economy 
-The party is too liberal 
Contemporary Issues: 968-86, 988-96, 1223-26 
-The party supports law and order 
-The party is too permissive 
-The party favors a woman's right to an abortion 
-The party is opposed to gun control 
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